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We measure accruals in defined benefit (DB) pension plans for public and 
private sector workers in Britain, using typical differences in scheme rules and 
sector-specific lifetime age-earnings profiles by sex and educational group. We 
show not just that coverage by DB pension plans is greater in the public sector, 
but that median pension accruals as a % of salary are almost 5% higher among 
DB-covered public sector workers than covered private sector workers. This is 
largely driven by earlier normal pension (retirement) ages. For workers of 
different ages in the two sectors, marginal accruals also vary as a result of 
differences in earnings profiles across the sectors. The differences in earnings 
profiles across sectors should induce caution in using calculated coefficients on 
wages from cross sections of data in order to estimate sectoral wage effects.  
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What is a public sector pension worth? 
1.  Introduction: pension coverage in the public and private sectors 
Analyses of workers’ remuneration using cross-sectional data in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and elsewhere have uncovered significant differences in pay levels 
between the public and private sectors after controlling for observed characteristics.
1 
Whether such differentials persist in the long run when we adjust for the self-selection 
of job movers and measure worker quality more precisely, however, may be open to 
question.
2 
One reason why long run pay differentials between sectors could persist in a 
competitive labour market even after controlling for worker heterogeneity is that jobs 
in different sectors vary in their pecuniary characteristics other than current pay, as 
well as in non-pecuniary characteristics. It is hard to believe that pay differentials 
between the public and private sector can be explained largely by differences in non-
pecuniary characteristics,
3 but there is one well-documented difference between 
public and private sector jobs in the UK: public sector jobs are much more likely to be 
covered by employer-provided pension plans (‘occupational pensions’ in UK 
parlance). 
Many occupations, particularly among white collar workers and in the public 
sector, are covered by ‘defined benefit’ (DB) pension plans that offer pensions 
calculated on number of years of service and a measure of salary usually based on the 
final year or an average of several final years of service. These pension plans typically 
also contain provisions for early retirement on a variety of grounds (most notably ill-
health) and are, in some cases, only partially funded by employee and employer 
contributions, particularly in the public sector. Employer-provided DB pension plan 
coverage is much less extensive in the private sector. Many private sector employers 
have taken advantage in recent years of the liberalisation of the ‘contracting-out’ rules 
                                                 
1 Previous studies for the UK include Bell et al (2007), Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary (1999), Henley 
and Thomas (2001), Disney and Gosling (1998). 
2 See, for example, Disney and Gosling (2003), Nickell and Quintini (2002), and Postel-Vinay and 
Turon (2005). 
3 With the UK public sector increasingly dominated by white collar occupations in public 
administration, health and education, given the privatisation and contracting-out of many manual-
dominated previously-public sector activities in the 1980s and 1990s, evidence of positive pay premia 
for public sector workers is hard to explain by non-pecuniary factors (except in rather obvious sub-
sectors such as the armed forces). However the findings of Di Nardo and Pischke (1997) can be taken 
as evidence that there is a pay premium attached to white collar occupations in general.  3
in the late-1980s to shift towards ‘defined contribution’ (DC) pension plans in which 
the employee, at least formally, bears all of both the investment risk during the 
accumulation phase and the annuity rate risk at the initial point of withdrawal. In this 
paper, we focus exclusively on differences in DB pension coverage between the 
public and private sector, and calculate what DB pension coverage is ‘worth’ to 
workers in the two sectors using new household data. 
Figure 1 illustrates the UK’s trends in public and private sector membership 
by DB pension plans over the period 1978–79 to 2003–04, using official data.
4 It 
shows that DB membership steadily declined in the private sector throughout most of 
the period whilst rising slightly in the public sector. These figures however understate 
the disparate underlying trends in coverage, especially in the late 1980s, because 
several industries such as utility providers were privatised during this period and such 
industries tended to have levels of DB pension coverage that were, on average, higher 
than those in the rest of the private sector.
5  
<<Figure 1 here>> 
The disparate trends would be better illustrated by trends in coverage rather 
than total membership – unfortunately it is hard to obtain consistent public and private 
sector employment figures to match exactly to these official data.
6  
To gain an idea of recent differences in public-private sector coverage by DB 
plans, Table 1 uses data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 2001, 
which asks respondents about the nature of their pension plan coverage (i.e. DB or 
DC) and their sectoral affiliation. The table differentiates DB coverage rates by sex, 
by two age bands, by social class and by ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ education 
defined respectively as leaving school at first school leaving age, staying in full-time 
education until 18, or leaving full-time education after age 18. The table shows a clear 
                                                 
4 ‘Contracted-out’ in the Figure refers to the arrangement over the period whereby, in the case of 
members of DB pension plans, employees and employers can pay a lower rate of social security 
contribution in return for the employee relinquishing rights during their contracted-out period to the 
second-tier social security pension scheme. The vast majority of DB plans will have chosen to contract-
out over this period. Note also that this source of data does not therefore provide exhaustive details on 
coverage by DC pension plans (either employer or individual based) – some of these will also have 
been contracted-out while others will have been contracted-in. 
5 See pages 114 to 117 of Pensions Commission (2004) for details on pension coverage over time 
taking into account the impact of privatisation. 
6 There are data for public and private sector employment – for example from the Labour Force Survey 
or NES/ASHE but it is difficult to get these figures to aggregate to the totals which match the DWP 
data in Figure 1. Broadly, private sector employment was falling in the 1990s and public sector 
employment rising after 2000.   4
disparity in coverage for both sexes, by age group and by education, across sectors. 
Men and those with more education are more likely to be covered by DB pension 
plans in both the public and private sectors. Note that the probability of coverage 
tends to rise with age for all workers in the private sector and for men in the public 
sector; less so for women in the public sector. 
<<Table 1 here>> 
The observed average characteristics of private sector DB members also differ 
considerably from those of public sector DB members. As shown in Table 2, on 
average those who are members of private sector arrangements are much more likely 
to be men and, on average, less likely to be in Social Class group I or II (professional 
or intermediate), to have lower levels of education and to be slightly younger than 
those who are members of public sector pension arrangements. Amongst men, 
members of private sector DB pension schemes have significantly higher mean 
earnings than members of public sector DB pension schemes, while amongst women 
there is no statistically significant difference in mean earnings between those who are 
members of private sector DB schemes and those who are members of public sector 
DB schemes.
7  
<<Table 2 here>> 
To the extent that DB pension arrangements are more generous than DC 
arrangements, the disparity in employer-provided pension coverage across sectors will 
provide a significant pecuniary advantage to many in the public sector. This might 
compensate for any pay ‘penalty’ or augment any measured pay ‘premium’ to public 
sector occupations. Moreover, apart from this remuneration ‘levels’ effect, there is 
also a ‘differences’ effect. Whilst the value of being covered by a public sector 
pension plan has declined somewhat in recent years due to a tightening of early 
retirement eligibility and efforts to increase employee contributions as a share of the 
total cost of providing pensions, the value of private sector pension coverage may 
have deteriorated more quickly due to the shift from DB to DC arrangements where 
that shift is associated with a drop in the size of the employer’s contribution. This 
point concerning the evolution of relative pension generosity over time has sometimes 
been made by pay negotiators on behalf of government departments in arguing that 
                                                 
7 These two statements are true both unconditionally and conditional on age.  5
public sector pay scale ‘uplifts’ should be below those negotiated in the private 
sector.
8 
We have recently calculated accrued and prospective pension rights for 
workers from all sources (including state-provided contributory benefits, employer-
provided pensions – both DB and DC – and personal pension accounts) using detailed 
evidence from the BHPS in 2001 (see Disney, Emmerson, Tetlow and Wakefield, 
2007a and 2007b for further details). Such calculations give pension rights that vary 
by characteristics (notably by age, education, sex and various provisions of the 
pension plan) and also depend on which of several plausible methods of measuring 
pension entitlements is chosen. In this analysis, we focus on these valuations of 
pension rights for members of employer-provided DB plans, distinguishing between 
public and private sector workers. Covered workers in the two sectors are found to 
have different accrued and prospective rights as a result of differences in average 
pension tenure, normal pension age, earnings profiles and accrual factors. Coverage 
differences may be an important source of variation in pension rights across the two 
sectors but are certainly not the whole story.
9 
However, before considering these calculations, it is useful to consider briefly 
the basic economics of the relation between pay and pensions, and in particular the 
standard neo-classical model in which different components of the pay package might 
be substitutes, and pensions in particular are seen as a form of compensatory 
arrangement. 
2.  Pensions and wages: theory and evidence 
 
The basic theory of pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation for pay 
differences needs little elaboration. Drawing on the standard model of the 
determination of remuneration levels across workers in a competitive market, a 
natural hypothesis is that, for a worker of given characteristics doing a job with 
                                                 
8 For example, the UK Health Departments, in their 2007 evidence to the NHS Review Body, which 
recommends pay uplifts to all workers covered by the NHS pay structure, noted that: “NHS pensions 
were a very valuable benefit which [the Review Body] might wish to take into account in assessing pay 
levels needed for recruitment and retention” (NOHPRB, 2007, para # 7.17). 
9 We reiterate that we are comparing the coverage and generosity of DB plans across sectors and do not 
examine the implications of the switch from DC to DB plans in the private sector. Such an analysis 
raises a number of additional issues concerning the intrinsic characteristics of the two types of pension 
plan as well as consideration of accumulated wealth in both DB and DC pensions – see Disney and 
Whitehouse (1996) and Disney et al (2007a).  6
certain characteristics, differences in future remuneration (e.g. pension rights) should 
offset differences in current wages. In principle, a test could easily be applied to 
measure an ‘offset’ coefficient in practice. Such a test could be carried out on pay 
levels, or by some methodology in differences that measured how, as pay evolved 
over time, the value of pension entitlements varied to compensate for differential 
changes in pay. 
There is some econometric evidence from the United States which supports 
such an ‘offset’ between current pay and future pension rights (as in Schiller and 
Weiss, 1980 and Woodbury, 1983) but such empirical results are most convincing 
only when studies utilise data where a single employee is offered alternative 
‘packages’ of current and deferred remuneration (as in the Woodbury paper). A well-
publicised illustration of this trade-off in remuneration packages was the UK 
Financial Services Authority’s decision in 2003 to offer higher wages to those who 
opted not to join the employer-provided DB plan than to those that had.  However few 
studies based on cross-sections of employees’ wages and pension plan coverage find 
convincing evidence of remuneration trade-offs of this type – indeed the correlation of 
pension rights (often imperfectly measured) and current pay is typically positive in 
such regressions and not negative as a naïve model of pecuniary compensation might 
suggest. 
One simple reason for failing to find offsets is that prospective pension rights 
are not measured correctly – a deficiency that we attempt to rectify here. A second 
limitation of such studies, which stems from their failure to consider the seminal work 
of Lazear (1979, 1981), is noted, inter alia, by Disney and Whitehouse (1996) and 
Ippolito (1997). If employers ‘tilt’ remuneration towards later in the working life as 
an incentive device, both in the form of pension rights and ‘wage tilt’, cross-section 
regressions of wages at a point in time on prospective pension rights are unlikely to 
provide a robust test of the hypothesis, even with basic controls such as seniority. 
Suppose for example, that private sector age-earnings profiles are largely 
characterised by the standard ‘inverted U’ associated with the accumulation and 
depreciation of human capital, whereas, for whatever reason, public sector profiles are 
characterised by incremental (‘seniority-based’) pay structures. A simple pooled 
cross-section regression which imposes the same coefficients on age across both 
profiles will likely fail to find any (negative) correlation between current (as opposed  7
to lifetime) pay and current accrual of pension rights. Moreover, workers with 
identical total lifetime remuneration but different age-earnings profiles can accrue 
different pension rights at retirement in DB pension schemes that are not based on 
average earnings. 
We utilise data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to investigate whether 
there are systematic differences in age-earnings profiles between the public and 
private sectors (and use these profiles in the next section to construct prospective 
pension accruals). These profiles are constructed by pooling thirteen years of the LFS 
from 1994 to 2006 (inclusive), netting out the average annual growth of earnings in 
the public or the private sector as applicable, and running quantile (median) 
regressions of reported (log) gross annual earnings on (five year moving average) age 
dummies separately for public and private sector workers of each sex and education 
group. The profiles are not therefore ‘true’ longitudinal profiles, although they can be 
so regarded if we discount future earnings at the average rate of earnings growth. The 
specification using five year moving average age dummies is depicted in Figure 2 (for 
men, A, and women, B). In other calculations (for example where we need to project 
pension rights), we find that these age-earnings profiles can be approximated by 
quadratics in age for men at least, albeit again we then allow for different curvatures 
according to sex, education and sectoral affiliation. 
<<Figure 2 here>> 
Figure 2A illustrates the age-earnings profiles for men by educational group and 
sectoral affiliation. Cumulating these data, the total lifetime remuneration in absolute 
terms of a man working throughout from age 21 to 59 in the public sector relative to 
the private sector is 3.3% higher for the lowest educational group, 5.7% higher for the 
middle educational group and 4.9% lower for the highest educational group.
10 These 
differences are statistically significant.
11  
                                                 
10 Note that we have netted out average earnings growth in each sector to focus on the age-earnings 
profile. Systematic differences in trend growth between the two sectors over any long period will 
therefore qualify this conclusion. In fact, over this period (1994-2006) earnings rose 0.4 percentage 
points faster per annum in the private sector than the public, but a later (or indeed earlier) starting date 
would give a somewhat different result. 
11 We carry out an F-test on whether or not the sum of the co-efficients in the log earnings equation are 
statistically different between men in the public sector and men in the private sector for each of these 
education groups. The test statistics (F(1,189721)) for the lowest, middle and highest education groups 
are 9.27, 18.27 and 20.88 all of which are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level.   8
Noticeable features of Figure 2A are that there is little difference in the age-
earnings profiles across the public and private sector for men in the lowest 
educational group, less evidence of declining wages for older public sector workers in 
the middle educational group relative to the private sector, and a marked greater 
‘hump’ (curvature) to private sector workers lifetime pay in the highest educational 
group – for example at age 40, private sector degree-educated workers are on average 
earning over 18% more than their public sector counterparts (with the estimated 
difference in median log wages being statistically significant at the 1% level 
F(1,189721)=7.48) even though the lifetime differential is only 4.9%. There are also 
differences in age-to-age volatility though this may just be sampling error. 
Figure 2B illustrates the profiles for women. These are very different between 
sectors, and it is important to note that this in part stems from our use of weekly not 
hourly earnings. So they are in part driven by changes in hours of work over the life 
cycle as well as variation in hours across sectors. Overall, women in the public sector 
throughout their working life have cumulatively higher total earnings than in the 
private sector: respectively 12.9% for the lowest educational group, 20.1% for the 
middle and 36.1% for degree level. Again these differences are statistically different 
from zero (with the F-test statistics, F(1,189721), for the lowest, middle and highest 
education groups being 176.24, 391.86 and 735.94 respectively). This likely arises 
from a combination of both differences in hours and pay. Whilst there seems to be a 
positive differential at most ages to the public sector, the impact is strongest among 
workers after age 40 and especially among the most educated workers. We attribute 
this difference to women disproportionately continuing in career jobs in the public 
sector (such as public administration, education and health) whereas private sector 
women with the same qualifications are more prone to cut their hours.
12 Given this 
variation in hours, the underlying curvatures of age-earnings profiles facing women 
who remain in full-time work through most or all of their working life are perhaps 
better represented by the profiles for men.  
Since most analyses of private and public sector earnings focus on ‘snapshots’ 
of earnings at particular ages, these lifetime profiles are of intrinsic interest. However 
                                                 
12 An alternative explanation would be higher earning women in the private sector being more likely to 
leave the labour market once they have children than higher earning women in the public sector.  9
their main use in the current context is to underpin calculations of pension rights 
across sectors, to which we turn in the next section. 
3. Pension rights  
 
Knowledge of several variables in addition to earnings profiles are required in 
order to provide a quantitative estimate of the value to each covered worker of 
membership of an employer-provided DB pension plan. These include: 
•  The worker’s tenure (years of service) in the pension plan; 
•  The timing of that pension tenure relative to retirement; 
•  The first age in the pension plan at which the member can normally 
collect benefits (‘normal pension age’);
13 
•  The accrual factor as a fraction of salary and other design features of 
the programme such as integration of the plan with the state scheme and any 
ceilings or floors to eligible earnings; 
•  Whether or not at the time of their death the plan member has a living 
husband, wife or civil partner who will continue to receive a stream of pension 
income; 
•  Vesting rules – that is, how long the worker has to be in the job to be 
eligible for pension benefits; 
•  The time profile of pay; 
•  Any differences in the scope for early retirement e.g. on grounds of ill-
health (which we do not consider here). 
In general terms, assume that the pension plan pays a capitalised annuity 
stream or pension benefit (PB) from a known age, R, that depends on years of service 
(n), a measure of the wage, W, and an accrual rate as a fraction of salary times an 
annuity factor related to life expectancy when the pension is first drawn (β). The 
present value of the accrued pension rights of an individual at working age a can be 
written as: 
) ( ) (
a R r
a a e nW PB PV
− − = β           (1) 
                                                 
13 Usually termed ‘normal retirement age’ in pension plans although individuals may in fact not retire 
from the workforce at this date. Note that ‘normal pension age’ is plan-specific and should not be 
confused with the ‘state pension age’ at which people can first collect the state pension.   10
where the appropriate wage in determining pension benefits is the most recent 
(current) wage and the stream is discounted at rate r. To compute the one period 
accrual from being in the plan for another year, we take the expected change in wages 
which is described below. The one year accrual can then be written as: 
() ()
11 ˆ () ( 1 )
rRa rRa
aa a a PV PB n W e n W e ββ
−− −−
→+ + ∆= + −      (2) 
For individuals who are currently married we also take into account the value of 
survivor benefits.
14 We now briefly describe the variables that underlie our estimates 
of (1) and (2). 
 Job tenure 
Job tenure primarily affects accrued rights to pensions although in general it is 
the prospective rights from continuing in the pensioned job that are a key component 
of the ‘option value’ method of viewing remuneration in the job (Stock and Wise, 
1990; Ippolito, 1995).
15 However current tenure in the pension plan can also affect 
prospective rights insofar as a growth in wages would increase pension entitlements 
even if pension tenure were not increased (see equation 2). 
In what follows we focus on the value of prospective one-year accruals of 
pension rights as the natural number to benchmark on annual pay, and for which 
accrued pension tenure is not a key determinant. Even so, in the context of accrued 
pension rights, it is interesting to note that median (mean) uncompleted pension plan 
tenures are considerably higher in the public sector than the private sector, at 10.5 
(12.2) years compared to 6.5 (9.5) years, among covered workers. (We use the self-
reported date of first joining the plan in the pension module of the BHPS in 2001 to 
calculate current pension plan tenure.) These differences are statistically significant. 
This difference is likely to have arisen because public sector workers typically have 
longer job tenures than private sector workers
16 and also because public sector DB 
pensions are generally more portable across public sector jobs than private sector DB 
plans, as the latter tend to be employer-specific. Differences in pension tenures are an 
important factor in explaining why we calculate median (mean) accrued current DB 
                                                 
14 These are set at 50% of the pension.  
15 For example, in a pure ‘option value’ model it is the prospective accrual in each future period that 
governs continued membership of the pension plan. However in more general models of state 
transitions e.g. retirement, accrued wealth may have an impact on saving, and therefore on labour 
market transitions. 
16 See Macaulay (2003)   11
pension rights in our sample among public sector workers to be £36,005 (£69,257) 
compared to £24,462 (£49,534) for private sector workers.  
Retirement (pension) age  
A key determinant of prospective pension rights is the age at which the worker 
can first receive full pension benefits without suffering a reduction in benefits on the 
grounds of early retirement (typically 4% per annum in UK pension plans). In our 
calculations, we assume that public sector workers have a normal pension age of 60 
and private sector workers have a normal pension age of 65. A lower normal pension 
age of course increases the value of prospective pension rights up until that age. The 
bases for choosing these normal pension ages are evidence reported in Bacon and 
Woodrow’s annual Pensions Pocket Book stating that two thirds of members of DB 
plans surveyed by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) in the private 
sector report a normal pension age of 65, whereas a majority of public sector workers 
are covered by plans that report a normal pension age of 60. Among the minority of 
public sector workers reporting a normal pension age of 65, however, are members of 
the Local Government Pension Scheme which, whilst having a ‘normal pension age’ 
of 65, also applied the ‘rule of 85’. Under this arrangement, which has since been 
reformed, individuals who retire before 65 qualified for unreduced pension benefits if 
their combined age and years of tenure in the pension plan reached 85 (although 
drawing pension benefits before age 60 required the permission of the employer).
17 
This rule means, of course, that a worker with as little as 25 years of pension tenure 
could retire on an unreduced pension at age 60 (and in some cases earlier).  
Since we are examining workers who have not yet retired, we do not know the 
actual retirement age of workers and, to the extent that expected retirement ages (or, 
more strictly, ages at which workers expect first to receive their pension) differ from 
these normal pension ages, we are incurring potential measurement error by 
mechanically applying rules governing normal pension age. However, data from the 
English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing
18 show that in 2002–03, among DB-covered 
workers aged between 50 and 59, there is a correlation between reported normal 
pension age and expected date of retirement: workers who report a normal pension 
                                                 
17 Source: http://www.lgps.org.uk/  
18 Marmot, M. et al. (2005). These data were supplied by the ESRC data archive.  12
age of 65 are significantly more likely to expect to work beyond 60 than those who 
report a lower value of their normal pension age.  
Accrual factors and vesting rules 
NAPF data show that the ‘typical’ private sector DB plan (i.e. 70%+ of 
covered members) applies a 1/60
th accrual rate to each year’s service whereas a 
typical public sector DB plan (around two-thirds of covered members) applies a 1/80
th 
accrual rate and offers a lump sum equal to 3/80
th of plan value at pension age. Since 
these features offset, in terms of generosity, they are not as important a determinant of 
sectoral differences in pension rights as, say, differences in normal pension ages. 
There are other potential differences: for example, in whether plans are integrated 
with either the contribution limits or benefits paid by the state (social security) 
programme.
19 Vesting rules – that is, the period of membership before members first 
become entitled to pension benefits – are typically two years compared to the United 
States, where such periods can be 5–10 years. In fact the costs to members of vesting 
periods have also been reduced still further in the UK since, under the 2004 Pensions 
Act, members have the right to receive a transfer value from the scheme based on a 
valuation of their own contributions, employer contributions and investment return if 
they leave before two years whereas previously they were only entitled to a refund of 
employee contributions. In our calculations, we focus only on accrual rates and 
accordingly apply the different accrual formulae to public and private sector workers. 
Life expectancy 
Accrued rights, and future accrual, will both be higher for individuals with 
longer life expectancies which, among other things, vary by both sex and social class. 
For example over the period 1997 to 2001 women in Social Class group I 
(professional) aged 65 had a remaining life expectancy of 20.6 years compared to just 
13.3 years among men in Social Class group V (unskilled manual) (Donkin, et al, 
2002). In our calculations we use cohort life expectancies which vary by both age and 
sex, and make an adjustment for differences in life expectancy by social class.
20 
                                                 
19 Evidence from the Pensions Pocket Book suggests that private sector plans are more likely to 
integrate with state benefits than those in the public sector. There are different methods of integration 
(on benefits, contribution schedules etc) but, to the extent that integration means lower benefits for 
given contributions, plans that are not integrated are more generous.  
20  Cohort life expectancy by age and sex is taken from the latest (2004) UK projections from the 
Government Actuary’s Department (http://www.gad.gov.uk/). We assume that the percentage  13
Differences in life expectancy between public and private sector pension 
arrangements in our model therefore arise insofar as the composition of members by 
sex, age and social class differ (see Table 2). 
Employee contributions 
The expected generosity of accrued and prospective pension rights to an 
employee will also depend on the extent to which the rights are being covered by his 
or her own pension contributions. However, at least in 2000, NAPF data show that on 
notional average employee contributions to final salary pension schemes were slightly 
higher in the private sector than in the public sector (4.6% of salary compared to 3.9% 
of salary).  The distribution of employee contributions in the public sector is two-
peaked: public sector plans are more likely to have relatively high employee 
contributions rates (of between 5% and 6% of salary) but they are also more likely to 
have relatively low employee contributions rates (of 2% of salary or less).  However 
the measure of salary that we use in our analysis is inclusive of pension contributions, 




As we are interested in the relation between pensions and pay, a natural 
measure of pensions is the prospective accrual of additional pension rights arising 
from one more year’s tenure in the pension plan as a fraction of annual pay. To 
estimate these accruals, we utilise the LFS-based age-earnings profiles constructed as 
described in Section 2, as well as the accrual factors and assumption as to normal 
pension age described above. Since we are forecasting prospective earnings, we 
replace the smoothed age dummies derived from past data used in Figure 2 by a 
quadratic in age, which (for men at least) provides a good approximation to the 
underlying curvature (see Figure 2A). Since the profiles are calculated net of 
                                                                                                                                          
difference in life expectancy by social class (separately for men and women) existing in England and 
Wales over the period from 1997 to 2001 continues in the future. Where social class is not known we 
use that of the individual’s partner, father or mother (in that order). In the 13 cases (out of a total of 
2,134) where the social class of a member of a final salary pension arrangement is still not known we 
assume that high education individuals are in Social Class I, mid education individuals are in Social 
Class IIIN and that low education individuals are in Social Class V. 
21 The incidence of employer’s contributions and the distinction between fully-funded, partially-funded 
and unfunded pension plans raises further issues which we do not consider here, since our primary 
focus is on valuing deferred pay (pension rights) relative to current pay.  14
economy-wide earnings growth in the public and private sector we add in an 
additional 2% per annum to reflect common economy-wide trends across sectors. 
Furthermore we restrict the profiles so that no individual sees a real decline in their 
pay of more than 2½% on the basis that this would represent a nominal cut in salary 
(assuming inflation of 2½%) which might be deemed unlikely. Given that women’s 
age-earnings profiles are affected by both pay rates and hours (see Figure 2B), we 
apply  men’s incremental age-earnings profiles to both men and women when 
calculating prospective accruals of pension rights over the next period.
22 The 
increment in pension wealth (accrual) is then measured as the value of pension rights 
after one more year’s membership of the plan less the value of current pension rights 
as in equation 2.  
Table 3 provides the absolute median values of these prospective one period 
pension accruals for the BHPS sample as a whole and for various sub-categories. The 
table also provides calculations of these accruals as a fraction of annual earnings and 
both the absolute and percentage of salary differences in these accruals between the 
public and private sector for each type of worker. Overall, average public sector 
pension accruals are found to be 24.8% of salary compared to 20.1% of salary for 
private sector workers. The somewhat greater life expectancy of women at the same 
pension age means that their accruals are somewhat higher as a share of earnings. 
However in absolute terms they are lower which is due to women’s average wages 
being lower than those of men.  Looking at differences in pension accrual as a share 
of earnings by sex and social class we find this ranges from 26.3% among women in 
the public sector in Social Class group II (intermediate, which, for example, includes 
teachers) to 16.9% among men in the private sector in Social Class group IV (semi-
skilled manual).  
<<Table 3 here>> 
Overall, pension absolute accruals in the public sector are almost 20% higher 
than in the private sector, but this discrepancy stems wholly from the highest educated 
                                                 
22 This may seem an extreme assumption, but not if it is believed that differential changes in men and 
women’s pay changes arise largely from differences in age, sector or education (for which we control). 
In relation to different average labour market experience between men and women, different pay levels 
arising from differential experience between men and women do not matter for our calculation; 
however if experience affects the growth of pay, our method is a simplification – for example if 
experience affects promotion prospects. Note that the implementation of job evaluation-based pay 
modernisation in the public sector in recent years should limit the scope for discriminatory pay 
increases between men and women based, directly or indirectly, on grounds of sex.   15
group for both sexes and from men who left school at 18 (the middle educated group).  
As a share of earnings we find that one-period pension accruals are higher in the 
public sector than in the private sector by a slightly larger amount for both men and 
women with higher levels of education, and men who left school at age 18, than it is 
for women who left school at age 18 and for both men and women who left school at 
16. The greater one-period pension accruals in public sector DB arrangements for 
men with higher levels of education will go some way to mitigating the greater pay 
seen in the private sector for this group (see Figure 2A).  
Figure 3 illustrates the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of one period 
pension as a fraction of current pay, differentiated by sector. Note that a few accruals 
are negative because the curvature of the age-earnings profile outweighs the assumed 
2% economy-wide earnings growth so that some individual workers have simulated 
negative real incremental earnings growth. Overall, however, it can be seen clearly 
that the public sector cdf lies to the right of the private sector cdf, confirming the 
summary statistics reported in Table 3. 




4. Interpretation and conclusion 
 
The analysis in the preceding section has confirmed not just that public sector 
workers are more likely to be covered by DB plans than private sector workers but 
also that as a percentage of salary the incremental accruals of pension wealth for DB 
covered public sector workers on average exceed those for DB covered private sector 
workers. For most groups, but not all, accruals in public sector DB arrangements are 
also worth more in absolute terms than those in private sector DB arrangements. For 
men with higher levels of education, the additional pension increments of public 
sector workers offset the somewhat lower values of cumulated lifetime earnings for 
public relative to private sector workers that are covered by DB plans  (assuming 
workers stay in the same sector throughout their life and on average follow the 
median profile for their educational group). For men who left education earlier there 
is no clear compensatory relationship. For women, we observe very different 
trajectories of earnings for women in the public sector relative to the private sector,  16
especially among those with higher levels of education. We interpret these as largely 
associated with differences in hours arising from different career trajectories and the 
nature of private and public sector jobs for women.  
Overall, however, the results emphasise two points made in the introduction. 
First, comparisons of public and private sector pay which ignore differential pension 
accruals miss an important part of the ‘story’. One-period accruals in the public sector 
are, on average, worth 4.7% of salary more in a public sector DB scheme than in a 
private sector DB scheme. Second, that attempts to test models of pecuniary 
compensation or pay differentials based on cross-section regressions pooled across 
sectors and with common parameters (especially with respect to age) are likely to 
generate erroneous results.  
We have shown that, on average, pension accruals are more generous for those 
covered by DB plans in the public sector than those covered by DB plans in the 
private sector. This could be for two reasons: first the effect of the different pay 
trajectories illustrated in Figure 2 (since pensions ultimately depend on salary at the 
end of the tenure in the pension plan) and second, the result of different plan rules 
between the two sectors: accrual factors, normal pension ages etc. We undertake a 
simple decomposition to discover whether it is the different age-earnings profiles in 
the sectors or whether it is the different plan rules (and primarily differences in 
normal pension ages) that cause the discrepancy in pension accruals between the two 
sectors. 
Table 4 undertakes this decomposition exercise for all public sector workers; it 
also differentiates the results by whether they are aged less than 40, or 40 and over. 
The first panel analyses all public sector workers, taking the average public sector 
accrual and then sequentially adjusts it by first replacing the public sector plan rules 
by those for the private sector, and then substituting private for public sector age-
earnings profiles. Overall these two changes would reduce the one-period pension 
accrual.  The analysis shows that just under two thirds of this reduction arises from 
different plan rules with the remainder from the different earnings profiles. Were the 
public sector rules to be replaced by private sector rules (with sector-specific earnings 
profiles), average absolute accruals would be similar in the two sectors (£3,638 in the 
public sector from Table 4 and £3,562 in the private sector from Table 3), but 
additionally replacing the public by private earnings profiles would reduce the  17
average absolute accrual among workers in the public sector below that in the private 
sector. (This is because a greater fraction of public sector workers are aged over 40, as 
indicated by the difference in average ages of members of each type of scheme in 
Table 2, and the ensuing discussion there applies). If the policy objective is to 
equalise absolute pension plan accruals in the two sectors, therefore, it would seem 
that changing the plan rules (and, primarily, the difference in normal pension age 
between the typical public and private sector plan) is a more sensible policy 
instrument than altering the wage structure. 
<<Table 4 here>> 
Table 4 also illustrates how this finding would differ if we look at workers 
aged below 40 and those aged 40 and over (since younger workers in the private 
sector will typically now have access only to DC plans, this is a particularly important 
issue). For younger workers, public pension accruals are in general a higher fraction 
of pay than for older workers; this would be reduced substantially by giving such 
workers the private sector plan rules. However imposing private sector earnings 
profiles on public sector workers would raise average pension accruals among young 
workers: this is not surprising given the different age-earnings profiles illustrated in 
Figure 2 – especially for those with higher levels of education. Conversely, for older 
workers, a change to private sector earnings profiles for public sector workers would 
reduce pension accruals even more sharply. Subject to sample size limitations, it is of 
course possible to undertake different decompositions and sub-analyses but these 
results illustrate the broad picture. 
What are the policy implications of the analysis? First, the results suggest that 
treating public sector pensions as a ‘free lunch’ for all public sector workers can be 
misleading: there is some evidence of compensation (offset) for comparisons across 
sectors for men with higher levels of education, and for women the career trajectories 
are so different in the two sectors that any pay-pension comparisons should be treated 
with caution. Of course other factors, which we have not considered, such as the 
extent of early retirement provisions and the amount of job security, may also differ 
between the public and the private sector. A further key policy issue is the extent to 
which the shift from DB to DC arrangements in the private sector, and any associated 
reduction in employer contributions, has led to headline differences in pay growth 
between the public and the private sector understating differences in total  18
remuneration.  Analysis of this issue, given that further waves of household panel data 
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Table 1 
DB pension coverage by age, sector, sex, education level and social class group 
  % covered 
  Age 20-39  Age 40-59  All 20-59 
   Public  Private  All  Public Private All  Public Private All 
           
All 69.8  26.7  36.9  70.0  33.2 45.7 69.9 29.4 40.9 
                      
Men 71.0  28.2  34.5  79.8  39.1 47.8 75.8 32.8 40.5 
Women 69.3  24.7  39.4  65.6  25.0 43.7 67.3 24.8 41.4 
                      
Education           
High   73.9  30.1  43.9  75.2 40.1 55.3 74.6 33.9 48.8 
Mid   67.1  27.9  34.8  72.2  37.8 48.3 69.5 31.0 39.4 
Low   57.3  21.7  26.7  59.0  26.6 34.4 58.4 24.1 30.7 
           
Social Class           
I  85.3 34.0 46.7 82.0 50.9 64.2 83.2 40.1 55.0 
II  76.6 36.2 49.2 72.7 40.8 54.7 74.5 38.2 51.8 
IIIN 71.1  27.6  37.0  80.3  31.7 47.7 76.0 29.2 41.6 
IIIM 63.3  21.4  25.3  56.5  28.4 32.0 59.5 24.5 28.4 
IV 52.9  14.0  23.1  52.9  27.9 35.8 52.9 20.0 29.0 
V  41.4 6.3 16.3  44.7  11.9 24.2 43.3  8.9  20.3 
Note: Social Class groups based on occupation: Group I = Professional; Group II = 
Intermediate; Group IIIN = Skilled non-manual; Group IIIM = Skilled manual; Group IV = 
Semi-skilled manual; Group V = Unskilled manual. Total sample size = 5,030. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the BHPS 2001.  
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Table 2 
Characteristics of members of DB pension schemes, by sex and sector 







      
All      
%  men  64.2 1.5 34.5 1.5 
Mean  age  39.0 0.3 40.8 0.3 
% high education  50.2  1.5  68.2  1.4 
% mid education  15.5  1.1  10.4  0.9 
% low education  34.3  1.5  21.3  1.3 
% social class I  6.4  0.8  7.8  0.8 
% social class II  37.9  1.5  48.4  1.5 
% social class IIIN  25.5  1.3  24.5  1.3 
% social class IIIM  19.2  1.2  6.5  0.8 
% social class IV  9.7  0.9  9.9  0.9 
% social class V  1.2  0.3  2.9  0.5 
Mean gross annual earnings  22,637  436  19,570  323 
           
Men           
Mean  age  40.1 0.4 41.5 0.5 
% high education  55.9  1.9  69.8  2.4 
% mid education  13.4  1.3  10.2  1.6 
% low education  30.7  1.8  19.9  2.1 
% social class I  7.3  1.0  12.1  1.7 
% social class II  41.7  1.9  39.1  2.5 
% social class IIIN  11.2  1.2  22.6  2.2 
% social class IIIM  27.2  1.7  10.2  1.6 
% social class IV  11.0  1.2  12.9  1.7 
% social class V  1.6  0.5  3.0  0.9 
Mean gross annual earnings  26,014  580  23,935  599 
           
Women           
Mean  age  37.1 0.5 40.5 0.4 
% high education  39.8  2.5  67.4  1.8 
% mid education  19.3  2.0  10.5  1.2 
% low education  40.9  2.5  22.0  1.6 
% social class I  4.7  1.1  5.5  0.9 
% social class II  31.1  2.4  53.3  1.9 
% social class IIIN  51.2  2.6  25.5  1.6 
% social class IIIM  5.0  1.1  4.6  0.8 
% social class IV  7.4  1.3  8.3  1.0 
% social class V  0.5  0.4  2.8  0.6 
Mean gross annual earnings  16,570  501  17,266  349 
      
Note: Social Class groups based on occupation: Group I = Professional; Group II = 
Intermediate; Group IIIN = Skilled non-manual; Group IIIM = Skilled manual; Group IV = 
Semi-skilled manual; Group V = Unskilled manual. Total sample size = 2,134. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the BHPS 2001.   22
Table 3 
Median estimated one-period accruals among members of DB pension schemes, 
by sector and characteristic 






earnings %  ppt 
        
All  3,562 20.1 4,263 24.8  19.7 +4.7 
            
Men            
All  4,008 19.4 4,938 24.1  23.2 +4.7 
        
High  education 5,139 20.6 5,764 25.7  12.2 +5.1 
Mid  education  3,569 18.5 4,490 24.0  25.8 +5.5 
Low  education  3,093 18.3 3,021 19.2  –2.3 +0.9 
         
Social class I  5,912  21.8  6,179 26.5  4.5  +4.7 
Social class II  5,615  20.8  6,222  25.7  10.8  +4.9 
Social class IIIN  3,179  19.5  5,367  25.7  68.8  +6.3 
Social class IIIM  3,468  18.5  3,793 23.2  9.4  +4.8 
Social class IV  2,514  16.9  3,026 20.4  20.4 +3.6 
Social  class  V  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
            
Women            
All  2,868 21.1 3,937 25.1  37.3 +4.0 
        
High  education 3,942 22.2 4,874 26.4  23.6 +4.2 
Mid  education  2,961 21.1 2,909 24.4  –1.8 +3.3 
Low  education  2,380 20.7 2,156 22.3  –9.4 +1.6 
         
Social class I  n/a  n/a  5,932 25.9  n/a n/a 
Social class II  4,624  22.0  4,929  26.3  6.6  +4.3 
Social class IIIN  2,531  21.1  2,843  24.5  12.3  +3.4 
Social class IIIM  n/a  n/a  2,410 23.9  n/a n/a 
Social class IV  n/a  n/a  1,814  22.8  n/a  n/a 
Social  class  V  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
        
Note: Social Class groups based on occupation: Group I = Professional; Group II = 
Intermediate; Group IIIN = Skilled non-manual; Group IIIM = Skilled manual; Group IV = 
Semi-skilled manual; Group V = Unskilled manual. Figures based on sample sizes of less 
than 30 not reported, those in italics signify sample size between 30 and 50. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the BHPS (2001) and the LFS (1994 to 2006).  
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Table 4 
Composition of differences in estimated one-period accrual between public and 
private sector DB schemes 
Median accrual   
£  % of earnings
    
All (sample size = 1,074)    
Public sector rules and earnings profiles  4,263  24.8 
Private sector rules and public sector earnings profiles 3,638 21.6 
Private sector rules and earnings profiles  3,232  21.1 
    
Those aged under 40 (sample size = 488)     
Public sector rules and earnings profiles  4,463  25.7 
Private sector rules and public sector earnings profiles 3,859 22.1 
Private sector rules and earnings profiles  4,039  23.3 
     
Those aged 40 and over (sample size = 586)     
Public sector rules and earnings profiles  4,049  24.2 
Private sector rules and public sector earnings profiles 3,492 21.3 
Private sector rules and earnings profiles  2,468  18.1 
    





Numbers of members of contracted out defined benefit pension schemes by 
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Note: Profiles exclude sector specific earnings growth. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the LFS (1994 to 2006).  26
Figure 3 
Cumulative distribution of simulated one-period defined benefit pension 
accumulation as a percentage of current pay, by sector, those aged between 16 
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Note: Sample size 2,134 comprising 1,060 members of private sector schemes and 1,074 
members of public sector schemes. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the BHPS (2001) and the LFS (1994 to 2006).  
 
 